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ARTICLES
A BIT LIABLE? A GUIDE TO NAVIGATING THE
U.S. SECONDARY LIABILITY PATCHWORK
Rebecca Giblint
Abstract
In terms of scholarly and media attention, copyright's secondary
liability doctrines long played a bit-part alongside direct liability's
leading lady. But since peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing providers
began facilitating billions of copyright infringements a decade ago,
those unassuming doctrines have been forced into starring roles. This
article shines a spotlight on U.S. secondary liability law ten years
after it first took center stage, highlighting the myriad uncertainties
and controversies that now plague its operation. These uncertainties
are illustrated with detailed reference to the hypothetical secondary
liability of BitTorrent Inc., the original and as-yet unlitigated
provider of the world's most dominant P2P file-sharing tool. This
work argues that the rhetoric underpinning the existing secondary
liability law is strongly protective of technology, but that the breadth
and depth of the uncertainties surrounding its proper application
effectively abrogates those protections by stealth.
t Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia. This paper was developed
from the author's PhD thesis, "The Code/Law Collision-Secondary liability for P2P copyright
infringement in the United States and Australia." Many thanks to Professor Mark Davison of
Monash University, who supervised the doctoral project, and Professors Sam Ricketson of the
University of Melbourne and Jacqueline Lipton of Case Western for their generous examination
of the completed thesis. This article was double-blind reviewed by an expert in the field in
accordance with the Australian Department of Education, Employment and, Workplace
Relations peer-review requirements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since Napster heralded the advent of the peer-to-peer (P2P) file-
sharing era almost a decade ago, a very public war has waged.
Content owners have fought to hold P2P providers liable for the
infringements of their users. Those providers have responded,
successfully in many cases, by releasing new software designed to fall
just outside the existing law. U.S. courts have struggled to apply often
inapposite precedent to these rapidly-shifting technologies, to
reconcile the mutually exclusive interests of the parties, and to
safeguard the broader interests of industry and consumers. After
almost a decade of being pulled in these competing directions, U.S.
secondary liability law has become a ragged patchwork. Frayed by
internal and cross-jurisdictional contradictions, its policy patches join
together haphazardly or not at all, and loose threads are threatening to
unravel its entire fabric.
This article seeks to tease out these loose threads by identifying
the law's most significant uncertainties and controversies in a single
coherent collection. Their potential consequences are highlighted via
a detailed walkthrough of the way in which the secondary liability
regime might apply to the creator of BitTorrent, an innovative,
popular, and as-yet unlitigated P2P file-sharing technology. Part II
begins by introducing and defining the BitTorrent technology. Part III
introduces the tort of inducement, one of three secondary liability
doctrines that exist within U.S. federal copyright law. After
identifying the most significant uncertainties to affect its application,
it gives detailed consideration to BitTorrent Inc.'s potential
inducement liability. Parts IV and V then engage in a similar exercise
with regard to the remaining two secondary liability doctrines,
contributory and vicarious infringement. Part VI concludes. The
rhetoric underpinning existing formulations of U.S. secondary
liability law tends to be strongly technology-protective. However, this
article argues that the failure of the courts and legislature to clarify the
increasing uncertainties that surround that law's proper scope and
content disproportionately dampens technological innovation and
investment-effectively abrogating those protections by stealth.
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II. BITTORRENT
BitTorrent was unleashed by software developer Brain Cohen in
2002.' Legend has it that it was developed as a solution to the
difficulties faced by members of the jamband community, who
struggled to download authorized copies of the large, high-quality
music files that are the focus of their hobby.2 One of the community's
initiatives was to create etree, an online music community that
promoted the lawful circulation of high-quality jamband recordings. 3
Finding etree's existing distribution processes "very painful to
watch," Cohen set out to create a better way to cheaply and efficiently
transfer very large files.4
The resulting technology indeed improved the transfer of
jamband recordings, and has since been widely used to facilitate the
legitimate distribution of a great deal of other content, including
software, 5 computer games, 6 and music. 7 Its adopters have included
such high-profile content-owners as Warner Brothers, 2 0 th Century
Fox, and MTV.8 However, the characteristics that made it invaluable
for the legitimate distribution of large files inevitably caused it to
become the tool of choice for unauthorized distribution of movies,
software and television shows.9 BitTorrent traffic has been estimated
1. Kim Peterson, BitTorrent File-sharing Program Floods the Web, SEATTLE TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2005,
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20050110&slug=bittorrent 10.
2. Ellen Lee, Founder of BitTorrent Unlocks the Secrets of Online File Sharing, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 6, 2006, at Fl, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.egi?file=/e/a/2006/08/06/BUG6OKAUQ71 .DTL&type=printable.
3. Etree, About Etree Org, http://wiki.etree.org/index.php?page=AboutEtreeOrg (last
visited Sept. 28, 2008).
4. Lee, supra note 2.
5. Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll. What Jambands Can Teach Us
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 687 (2006).
6. For example, Blizzard Entertainment uses an application based upon the BitTorrent
protocol to distribute its extremely popular World of WarCraft software. E.g., Blizzard, World
of Warcraft - Frequently Asked Questions, http://eu.blizzard.comr/en/wow/faq/bittorrent.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
7. See Schultz, supra note 5, at 687 (discussing etree's use of BitTorrent to distribute
jamband music).
8. Peter Bowes, Warner to Start Movie Downloads, BBC NEWS, May 9, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/4753435.stm; Sunshine Mugrabi, BitTorrent Hooks Big
Studios, RED HERRING, Nov. 29, 2006, http://www.redherring.com/Home/I9936.
9. See, e.g., Posting of Enigmax to TorrentFreak, http://torrentfreak.com/2008-080427/
(Apr. 27, 2008); Posting of Enigmax to TorrentFreak, http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-users-
refuse-to-pay-copyright-fines-080615/ (June 15, 2008); Posting of timothy to Slashdot,
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/05/21/2214244 (May 21, 2005, 18:18 EST).
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to comprise between 35% and 67.5% of all global Internet traffic.' 0 A
quick search on any Internet search engine results in torrent files
linking to a cornucopia of infringing movies, music, television shows,
and computer games. I" Torrent hosting websites display statistics
showing that popular movies and television shows are regularly
downloaded via BitTorrent tens or even hundreds of thousands of
times each.' 2  Although the ephemeral and disparate nature of
BitTorrent networks makes it difficult to accurately gauge what
proportion of overall usage is infringing, there can be no doubt that it
is extremely substantial.
In addition to its wide use for infringing and noninfringing
distribution, other characteristics make BitTorrent the ideal "litmus
test" for this work's analysis. 13 Unlike those behind some previous
P2P technologies, BitTorrent's creator "seems interested only in
noninfringing uses, and has said all the right things about
infringement-so consistently that one can only conclude he is
sincere.' 4 The technology itself "is nicely engineered, offering novel
benefits to infringing and noninfringing users alike," and it has no
infringement-centric business model. 15 Additionally, BitTorrent Inc.
supplies both a product (the BitTorrent software) and a service (its
online search engine). Thus, the technology provides the grist for a
full exploration of existing secondary liability principles in all their
permutations.
The term BitTorrent may refer to a number of distinct concepts,
including the company created by Cohen to commercialize the
technology, the protocol that dictates its operation, the software
provided by that company to end-users, and equivalent software
10. In Praise of P2P, THE ECONOMIST TECH. Q., Dec. 4, 2004, at 35; Posting of Bram
Cohen to LiveJournal, http://bramcohen.livejoumal.com/35949.html (Jan. 31, 2007, 16:53 EST);
Eric Bangeman, P2P Responsible for as Much as 90 Percent of all 'Net Traffic, ARS TECHNICA,
Sept. 3, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070903-p2p-responsible-for-as-much-as-
90-percent-of-all-net-traffic~html (discussing estimates that P2P traffic accounted for as much as
90% of Internet traffic and BitTorrent accounted for as much as 75% of P2P traffic).
11. See, e.g., EZTV, TV Torrents Online, http://eztv.it (last visited Sept. 8, 2008);
NewTorrents.info, http://www.newtorrents.info (last visited Sept. 8, 2008); The Pirate Bay,
http://www.thepiratebay.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2008).
12. See, e.g., EZTV, supra note 11; NewTorrents.info, supra note 11; The Pirate Bay,
supra note 11. All three sites maintain statistics showing the total number of completed torrent
transfers.
13. Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker Blog, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=859 (June 28, 2005, 10:26 EST).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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provided by independent third-parties.1 6 Professor Edward Felten has
warned that injudicious conflation of these terms can lead to "faulty
reasoning."'" According to Felten:
[A] court could hypothetically shut down BitTorrent.com (if the
company were found to be a lawbreaker) but it could neither
undistribute the software code that was already in users' hands, nor
uncreate the protocol. Critics who are thinking sloppily (or want
their audiences to think sloppily) sometimes ignore these
distinctions.
18
To preserve these distinctions, this article refers to the company
behind the technology as "BitTorrent Inc.," and the protocol or set of
instructions explaining how BitTorrent operates as "the BitTorrent
protocol." 19
In order to distribute files via the BitTorrent process, individuals
must utilize a piece of software that implements that protocol.
BitTorrent Inc. provides one such implementation, but it is far from
the only source of BitTorrent file-sharing software.2° When Cohen
released the inaugural BitTorrent client, he made its underlying
source code widely available and provided a general license allowing
third-parties to further develop and distribute the software. 21 The
protocol documentation, specifying the requirements necessary to
create a compatible client, was also made available online.22 As a
result, any person with the requisite programming skill can write their
own BitTorrent implementations, and hundreds or even thousands of
individuals and organizations have done so to date.23 In these
16. Posting of Ed Felten to Freedom to Tinker Blog, http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=824 (May 26, 2005).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. The BitTorrent Protocol is freely available online. E.g., Brain Cohen, The BitTorrent
Protocol Specification (Jan. 10, 2008), http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0003.html;
Theory.org, BitTorrent Protocol Specification v 1.0,
http://wiki.theory.org/BitTorrentSpecification (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
20. Other sources of BitTorrent file-sharing software include Azureus and uTorrent. See
Posting by par to Common Web Sense, http://www.commonwebsense.com/2006/01/27/the-
bittorrent-post/ (Jan. 27, 2006).
21. BitTorrent.com, BitTorrent Open Source License,
http://www.bittorrent.com/bittorrent-open-source-license (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
22. See Cohen, supra note 19.
23. For a list of currently available BitTorrent clients, see Wikipedia, BitTorrent Client,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent client (last visited Sept. 6, 2008); see also Sourceforge,
BitTorrent Project Results, http://sourceforge.net/softwaremap/trovelist.php?form cat-622
(last visited Sept. 6, 2008). Note that BitTorrent Inc. has subsequently purchased some of these
clients, including the popular VTorrent. See Posting of George Ou to Real World It,
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circumstances it is necessary to distinguish BitTorrent clients in the
broader sense from the specific client provided by BitTorrent Inc.,
which is the subject of this analysis. This work refers to them as
"BitTorrent clients" and "the BitTorrent software," respectively.
A. The BitTorrent Process
The BitTorrent distribution process begins when the holder of a
computer file uses a BitTorrent client to divide the file into a number
of much smaller pieces, and to create a corresponding "torrent" file.
2 4
Torrents are tiny files that contain metadata about the computer file,
including the number of pieces into which it was divided, the order in
which they should be pieced back together, and the Internet location
of the tracker for that particular torrent.25 Trackers maintain
information about the users distributing the file, which they use to
facilitate communications between users.26 They act as a "rendezvous
point" for those involved in distributing the file associated with a
particular torrent.27 Unlike previous P2P file-sharing technologies
such as Napster, Gnutella and Kazaa, which created vast single
networks via which any kind of content could be distributed,
BitTorrent facilitates the creation of a different network for each file,
each centered around a particular torrent.
28
Also unlike previous P2P technologies, BitTorrent client
software has traditionally had no integrated search functionality to
assist users in locating the desired content. 29 Instead, individuals find
http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=389 (Sept. 27, 2008). BitTorrent Inc. then released an updated
version of Torrent as its official client. Note that while all versions of its software released
until July 2007 were open source, the JTorrent-based client is closed source. This does not
prevent continued development by alternate providers however, since the source code of all
previous iterations and the protocol itself remain fully documented and "publicly accessible
without the need for a license." Ryan Paul, BitTorrent's Closed Protocol: Fact or Fiction?
(updated), Ars Technica, Aug. 10, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070810-will-
bittorrent-protocol-documentation-be-publicly-available-bittorrent-inc-president-says-no-
company-web-site-says-yes.html; see also Thomas Mennecke, BitTorrent Addresses Closed
Source Issues, Slyck, Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.slyck.com/story1566.html.
24. See, e.g., BitTorrent Protocol Specification vi.0, supra note 19.
25. JOHAN POUWELSE ET AL., A MEASUREMENT STUDY OF THE BITTORRENT PEER-TO-
PEER FILE-SHARING SYSTEM,T 2-3 (2004), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 10.1.1.3.4761 &rep=repl &type=pdf.
26. Id.
27. M. Izal et al., Dissecting BitTorrent: Five Months in a Torrent's Lifetime, in PASSIVE
AND ACTIVE NETWORK MEASUREMENT, at 1, 2 (Chadi Barakat & Ian Pratt eds., 2004).
28. See John Borland, BitTorrent File-swapping Networks Face Crisis, ZDNET NEWS,
Dec. 20, 2004, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588_22-140385.html.
29. Note however that some clients now include a link to search engines enabling users to
search for torrents from within the client. See, e.g., Webmonkey, Xtorrent: Mac BitTorrent
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the torrents associated with the content they wish to download by
searching via search engines or specialized indexing on hosting
sites. 30 BitTorrent Inc. itself provides one such torrent search engine,
which is located on its website. 31 Launched in May 2005, the facility
"crawls" the World Wide Web for torrent files and provides users
with search responses from the resulting index.32 It apparently
operates independently of the BitTorrent software and protocol.33
BitTorrent Inc.'s search engine is far from the only source for finding
torrent files online.34 Numerous other torrent search engines and
indexes are freely available, although they regularly disappear as the
result of actual or threatened legal action.35 Torrents can even be
located via a Google search by adding "filetype:torrent" to any
* 36inquiry.
BitTorrent Inc.'s search engine has sometimes been known to
link to infringing content. During the search facility's launch for
example, a reporter asked BitTorrent Inc.'s Chief Operating Officer
(C.O.O.) to conduct a search for "The Interpreter," a big-budget
Hollywood movie that was, at the time, still showing in U.S.
cinemas. 37 "[T]he top result was an illicit copy of the Nicole Kidman
film.., offered on The Pirate Bay, a torrent [host] in Sweden known
for making pirated movies, music and software freely available in
Client with Integrated Search,
http://www.webmonkey.com/blog/Xtorrent:_MacBitTorrentClient-with Integrated Search
(last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
30. See Pouwelse, supra note 25 at 1.
31. Bittorrent.com, BitTorrent Search Engine,
http://www.bittorrent.com/nowplaying?csrc=splash (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
32. Kevin Poulsen, Next for BitTorrent: Search, WIRED, May 23, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2005/05/67596.
33. Felten, supra note 16.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Associated Press, File-Swap Site Folds for Good, WIRED, Dec. 20, 2004,
available at http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/12/66099 (reporting the
closure of hosting site Supmova.org); Greg Sandoval, TorrentSpy Ordered to Start Tracking
Visitors, CNET NEWS, June 8, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/TorrentSpy-ordered-to-start-tracking-
visitors/2100-1030_3-6189866.html?part=rss&tag=2547-I _ 3-0-5&subj = news (reporting on a
court order requiring the TorrentSpy indexing site to begin tracking the IP addresses of its
users); Posting of Ernesto to TorrentFreak, http://www.torrentfreak.com/mpaa-takes-down-
isohunt-podtropolis-torrentbox-070925/ (Sept. 5, 2007) (regarding the IsoHunt torrent tracker
and host's decision to deny access to U.S. visitors as the result of a lawsuit instituted by the
MPAA).
36. TechBuzz, How to Search Torrents Using Google, http://tech-
buzz.net/2006/08/0 l/how-to-search-torrents-using-google/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
37. See Poulsen, supra note 32.
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open defiance of publishers. 38 However, that event has proved to be
an exception. BitTorrent Inc. has worked to create filters that
preemptively block access to infringing results, and now claims that
its search engine "will not surface links for unlicensed content."
39
Once a torrent file is downloaded, BitTorrent clients allow users
to share pieces of the associated computer file with others in a "tit-
for-tat" fashion until they have assembled the complete file.4 ° Once a
user has obtained a piece of the file from one source, it begins
uploading it to other users while simultaneously downloading
additional pieces. 41 By spreading the distribution of the file across all
users, rather than concentrating it on the few that have the entire copy,
popular content can be distributed very widely, and very fast. 42 While
this makes the technology attractive to infringing users, it is not at all
protective of their anonymity. 43 It is a simple process to identify the
IP addresses of all users downloading from a particular torrent at a
particular time.
44
The following three Parts now examine the three secondary
liability doctrines that exist within the U.S. federal copyright
framework, with a particular emphasis on the controversies that affect
their operation. The potential effects of those uncertainties are then
further highlighted with. reference to their likely impact on BitTorrent
Inc.'s secondary liability for providing the technology outlined above.
In each of those analyses, the existence of direct or primary
infringement is assumed.45
38. Id.
39. P-to-P Goes Hollywood, INFOWORLD, Jan. 1, 2007,
http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/01/01/01NMmain_ .html.
40. BRAM COHEN, INCENTIVES BUILD ROBUSTNESS IN BITTORRENT 3 (2003),
http://www.bittorrent.org/bittorrentecon.pdf.
41. Id. at 1.
42. Id.
43. Seth Schiesel, File Sharing's New Face, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/ (enter the article's title in the search box at the top of the page; then
follow the first link to the article posted February 12, 2004) (quoting Cohen as saying that using
BitTorrent for infringement "is patently stupid because it's not anonymous, and it can't be made
anonymous because it's fundamentally antithetical to the architecture.").
44. Id.
45. This assumption is based on the fact that abundant evidence exists that BitTorrent
does facilitate widespread copyright infringement, and the fact that in past P2P cases involving
similar instances of copying, infringement has been made out without difficulty. See, e.g., A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2000); In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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III. INDUCEMENT LIABILITY
A. Introducing Inducement Liability
Created by the Supreme Court in 2005 in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,46 inducement liability is the newest
addition to the secondary liability toolkit. In Grokster, a number of
content owners sought to hold two P2P software providers liable for
the massive amount of infringement their products facilitated.47
Lower courts absolved the defendants from liability on the basis that
the circumstances narrowly fell outside existing formulations of
secondary liability doctrines.48 In the Supreme Court, the plaintiff
content owners sought to remedy that situation and create a favorable
precedent for dealing with future threats through the dramatic
expansion of existing doctrines. The plaintiffs proposals were
strenuously opposed by a number of diverse interest groups as
unacceptably hampering technological innovation. 4  While
unanimously considering that the defendants should not escape
liability for their behavior, but irrevocably split as to whether they
should be liable under existing law, the Court introduced inducement
liability as a "compromise" solution.50
As formulated by the Court, inducement liability occurs where a
defendant "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
steps taken to foster infringement." 51 Three "particularly notable"
indicia of intent were held to be "unmistakable" evidence of the
defendants' "unlawful objective:, 5 2 the fact that each defendant
"showed itself to be aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for
copyright infringement," 53 their failure to develop any mechanisms to
46. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
47. Id. at 920.
48. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003),
aff'd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
49. For a list of amicus briefs filed in support of the respondents in Grokster, see
Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF: MGM v. Grokster,
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/MGM-v Grokster/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
50. See Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 SUP. CT. REv. 229, 249 (2006); Jay
Dratler, Jr., Common-Sense (Federal) Common Law Adrift in a Statutory Sea, or Why Grokster
was a Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 413, 414-16
(2006).
51. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37.
52. Id. at 939-40.
53. Id. at 939.
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reduce their products' use for infringement,54 and the fact that their
business models were predicated on infringement.55 The Court
qualified the second two factors, making it clear that they were
contingent on the first: neither would apparently "justify an inference
of unlawful intent" alone, but could combine with the first factor to
add weight to the intention matrix.5 6 After strongly suggesting that the
defendants were liable for inducement on these grounds, the Court
remanded the matter to the district court for final adjudication.57 One
defendant settled before the final resolution of the case; summary
judgment was granted against the other in that forum.58
The Court's opinion is open to a number of possible
interpretations. 59 That, combined with the novelty of the doctrine,
means that there is little guidance available as to the nature and
degree of evidence a plaintiff must produce to show inducement
liability. By far the biggest controversy concerns whether or not the
mere act of releasing a product may satisfy the inducement standard.
60
Post-Grokster, two competing interpretations have reached
different conclusions about whether the mere act of releasing a
product may satisfy the inducement standard. Under the distribution
plus intent theory, the mere act of releasing a product of a particular
design can indeed render a defendant liable for inducement "so long
as it was done with bad intent." 6' The intent requirement is a highly
"amorphous" standard that is capable of being satisfied by a vast
range of behaviors. 62 Indeed, it has been said to be almost certain that
whenever there is a technology that is used for infringement, "[t]here
[will always be] evidence of intent." 63 Ginsburg and Ricketson argue
that the degree of infringement may be sufficient in and of itself to
54. Id.
55. Id. at 940.
56. Id. at 939-40.
57. Id. at 941.
58. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see
also Rebecca Giblin, On Sony, StreamCast, and Smoking Guns, 29 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
215, 215 (2007).
59. See Posting of Doug Lichtman to Picker MobBlog,
http://picker.typepad.com/pickermobblog/2005/06/lichtmanreadin.html, (June 29, 2005);
Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 234 (2005).
60. See Wu, supra note 50, at 245.
61. Lemley, supra note 59, at 234.
62. See 21st Century Copyright Law in the Digital Domain Symposium Transcript, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 257-59, 267 (2006), available at
http://www.mttlr.org/volthirteen/symposium.pdf.
63. Id. at 267.
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satisfy the intent standard. "[W]here a device facilitates infringement
on a massive scale, its distributor will likely be found to have
intended that result." 64 Accordingly, under this interpretation, the
mere act of releasing a product that is widely used for infringement
may be sufficient evidence of inducement.
In contrast, the narrower interpretation holds that all the bad
intent in the world cannot make inducement liability attach in the
absence of some "active step" taken by the defendant "with the
purpose of bringing about infringing acts." 65 This theory goes a step
further than the first, requiring, in addition to the distribution of a
product with intent that it will be used for infringement, evidence that
the defendant took some positive step beyond the actual provision of
the product to facilitate that infringement. 66 One way of satisfying the
test is by demonstrating that a defendant "broadcast[] a message
designed to stimulate others to commit violations."
67
B. Inducement Liability & BitTorrent
Has BitTorrent Inc. "distributed a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement?, 68 Of the three
things BitTorrent Inc. provides-its software, protocol, and search
service-only its software seems to be a "distributed device."
However, its provision of the associated services may nonetheless be
relevant to the issue of intent.
69
In these circumstances, whether inducement liability would fix
upon BitTorrent Inc. would depend largely on which of the two
competing theories prevails.
64. Jane C. Ginsburg & Sam Ricketson, Inducers and Authorisers: A Comparison of the
US Supreme Court's Grokster Decision and the Australian Federal Court's KaZaa Ruling, 11
MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).
65. Wu, supra note 50, at 246; see also MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster. Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 938 (2005).
66. See Wu, supra note 50, at 246.
67. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 916.
68. Id. at 919.
69. There is some doubt about whether this includes the search engine. The § 512(d) safe
harbor discussed above would acquit BitTorrent Inc. for any inducement liability by virtue of
the provision of that facility alone. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000). However, it is less clear
whether it would operate to prevent it from being relevant, in combination with other factors, to
a finding of inducement. For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that the more plaintiff-
friendly approach would prevail, and that BitTorrent Inc.'s provision of the search engine would
indeed be relevant to its inducement liability.
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1. The Active Step Theory
Under the active step theory, BitTorrent Inc. would be liable for
inducement if it could be shown that it took some "active step" to
bring about third-party infringement. 70 There is little evidence that it
has done so. BitTorrent Inc. has promoted its software as a useful tool
for efficient legitimate content distribution.7' Creator Brain Cohen has
consistently denounced its use for Internet piracy, describing those
who use it for infringement as "patently stupid" because the software
is designed in such a way that it makes no attempt to hide the
identities of downloading users.72 The fact that it is simple to obtain
the Internet address of every person currently downloading the file
actually assists content owners in identifying direct infringers.
Overall, the impression is far different to that cast by BitTorrent Inc.'s
predecessors in Grokster.
However, not all of BitTorrent Inc. and Cohen's conduct stands
up so well to scrutiny. For example, Cohen once authored a document
declaring himself to be a "technological activist" and claiming that he
created programs to "commit digital piracy. 73 This was subsequently
disclaimed as a parody,74 but it nonetheless raises the question-could
this satisfy the requirement of "clear expression" of intent to promote
infringement? What if it was considered in combination with the text
on the BitTorrent.com webpage exhorting users to "Get BitTorrentTM
- Our client helps you find and download cool stuff to watch, hear,
and enjoy"? Or its one-time motto, "find download enjoy"? 7 "Cool
stuff' doesn't necessarily mean unauthorized content, and
downloaded content doesn't have to be copyrighted to be enjoyable.
Broadly however, both descriptions are arguably more applicable to
70. Wu, supra note 50, at 246.
71. See'Press Release, BitTorrent Inc., BitTorrent Secures $20 Million in Venture Capital
(Dec. 1, 2006), http://www.bittorrent.com/pressreleases/2006/12/01/bittorrent-secures-20-
million-in-venture-capital/.
72. Schiesel, supra note 43 (quoting Cohen as saying that using BitTorrent for
infringement "is patently stupid because it's not anonymous, and it can't be made anonymous
because it's fundamentally antithetical to the architecture.").
73. Bram Cohen, I am a Technological Activist,
http://bitconjurer.org/a_technological-activists agenda.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
74. Id.
75. These phrases have now been removed from the BitTorrent.com website. However,
according to the Internet Archive "Wayback Machine," they were featured on the site until at
least May, 31 2006. See Internet Archive,
http://web.archive.org/web/20060531012912/http://www.bittorrent.com/ (last visited Feb. 9,
2007).
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copyrighted and unauthorized content, and so these descriptors may
potentially be seen as evidence of intent.
Another possible "active step" toward fostering infringement is
BitTorrent Inc.'s provision of its torrent search engine. Although the
search engine operates independently of the BitTorrent software, it
gives BitTorrent Inc. the ability to find out in a general way what
sorts of material BitTorrent users are using the technology to
distribute. The decision to provide the search engine was criticized by
Felten as a poor "strategic move. 76 He argues that the search facility
does not actually make it much easier for BitTorrent users to find
torrent files, since there are plenty of other search engines available,
but it does make BitTorrent Inc. appear more complicit in, and
supportive of, copyright infringement than it otherwise would.77 This
perception is enhanced by the instructional hint that once appeared
directly under the search field: "Example searches: Movies, Games,
TV, Music, Anime., 78 The vast majority of each of these forms of
expression are copyrighted and not licensed for free distribution.
Could the provision of such a search engine, and/or the accompanying
words, constitute the requisite "active step?" The answer to this
question is likely to be "no." The online search engine has, at times,
contained links to.infringing files,79 and the words that accompanied it
on the website could be interpreted as implying that infringing
material is available.80 However, BitTorrent Inc. has undertaken
diligent and public efforts, in conjunction with content interests, to
filter out infringing material.81 In these circumstances, the provision
of the search engine is unlikely to be construed as an active step
intended to bring about infringement.
Although the material on the public record does not seem
sufficient to support a finding of inducement liability, it is always
76. Felten, supra note 16.
77. Id.
78. Those words were featured on the BitTorrent search engine as of Feb. 15, 2007, but
were subsequently removed. To compare the before and after web pages, see Intemet Archive,
http://www.archive.org/web/web.php (enter www.bittorrent.com into the Wayback Machine
search box and click "take me back." Then click the "compare archive pages" link located on
the top right. This will cause a series of checkboxes to appear. Check Feb. 13, 2007 and Mar.
08, 2007 and click "compare two dates" located in the top left) (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
79. See Poulsen, supra note 32.
80. See supra note 75 (showing examples of infringing computer games, including
Civilization III, SWAT 4, and Empire Earth II on BitTorrent's then home page).
81. See, e.g., Sharon Waxman, Web Site Agrees to Help Curb Access to Movies, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/23/technology/23film.html?_r I&oref-slogin.
20081
20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
possible that future discovery could disclose some smoking gun
evidence of an active step. As in Grokster, such evidence would then
open the door to other less active evidence of intent. Without it,
however, such evidence would not be open to consideration. Based on
application of the active step theory of inducement, BitTorrent Inc.
would apparently have no inducement liability for unleashing the
BitTorrent technology.8 2
2. The Distribution Plus Intent Theory
The outcome would likely be different under the distribution
plus intent theory, which places considerably less emphasis on the
need for affirmative steps and opens a far wider range of conduct to
interpretation as evidence of intent.
Under this theory, a court may find it significant that BitTorrent
was designed without any technical measures to reduce infringement.
This is particularly so in light of the fact that the etree community, for
which the technology was apparently created, closely monitors for
infringing content, and has strict anti-infringement policies that are
integral to its operation.83 In this regard, it might be relevant to
compare BitTorrent to the FurthurNet technology that launched a year
before it. Like BitTorrent, FurthurNet was developed to facilitate the
sharing of jamband music. Despite the unusually strong anti-
infringement norms predominant in the jamband community,
copyright infringement remains an ongoing problem.8 4 With that in
mind, FurthurNet was designed to implement strict filtering protocols
that limited distribution to the recordings of musicians who agreed to
permit it.85 The FurthurNet organization claims that "[t]his allows the
Furthur Network to maintain the status quo of a 100% legit network
of legally traded live music, while allowing* easy future
expandability." 86 The fact that such technology was released to a
similar market at an earlier time may suggest that the failure to
82. See Adam V. Vickers, Peering Beyond Today's Internet File Sharing Concerns: The
Future of BitTorrent Technology, 8 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133, 145 (2006) (reaching
similar conclusions); see also Felten, supra note 13; Posting of Mark Schultz to Technology &
Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2005/06/what-happens to.htm (June
28, 2005).
83. See Etree, Legal, http://www.etree.org/legal.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2008); Schultz,
supra note 5, at 681-83.
84. See, e.g., Etree, supra note 83; Furthur Network, General Etiquette,
http://www.furthumet.org/community/etiquette.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
85. Schultz, supra note 83, at 686.
86. Furthur Network, Features, http://www.furthumet.org/about/features.html (last visited
Sept. 27, 2008).
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include similar filtering technology in BitTorrent may constitute
evidence of intent to foster infringement.
It may also be relevant that Cohen created BitTorrent in a post-
Napster, post-KaZaa world. Having experienced the phenomenon of
those distribution technologies attracting millions of users and
publicly facilitating billions of infringements, it must have been clear
to Cohen that it was infringement that truly drove the success of the
companies behind these technologies. These circumstances suggest
that, if Cohen wanted his P2P distribution technology to be a success,
he wanted people to use it for infringement. That may also be seen as
evidence of intent under this looser interpretation.
As explained above, Ginsburg and Ricketson have suggested that
the very prevalence of infringement facilitated by a particular
technology may itself constitute intent.87 "[W]here a device facilitates
infringement on a massive scale, its distributor will likely be found to
have intended that result. Where the infringement is relatively modest
in scale, inducement will not be found ... ,88 While it is difficult to
quantify the amount of infringement that occurs via BitTorrent, it
could better be described as "massive" than "relatively modest". The
rampant uptake of the technology, popularity of torrent indexing
websites, and ready availability of infringing material all indicate that
it dwarfs anything that has previously been seen. 89 Accordingly, if
this interpretation prevails, the prevalence of the technology's use for
infringement may in itself be sufficient evidence of BitTorrent Inc.'s
intent.
3. Conclusion
Whether or not a technology provider is liable for inducement
will largely depend on which of the theories described above, if
either, eventually prevails. Post-Grokster inducement case law
remains sparse. However, almost three years after the decision was
handed down, no court has yet held a defendant liable simply for
releasing a product, no matter how much infringement ensued as a
result. The fact that "the entertainment industry has neither sued nor
87. See Ginsburg & Ricketson, supra note 64 at 7.
88. Id
89. See, e.g., Posting of Ernesto to TorrentFreak, http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-sites-
are-slowly-taking-over-the-Intemet (Sept. 27, 2008) (announcing that four torrent sites have
entered the list of the world's 500 most popular websites); TorrentSites, BitTorrent Sites,
http://www.torrentsites.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2008) (listing hundreds of independent torrent
hosting sites); ZeroPaid, Torrent Sites, http://www.zeropaid.com/links/bittorrent/?id=2 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2008) (listing hundreds of BitTorrent trackers).
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shut down all of p2p file sharing services .... [and it appears] that the
Grokster decision has not stopped or even slowed down p2p file-
sharing" 90 suggests that the active step theory is currently in the
ascendant.
If this were the end of the matter, technology providers would
have clear guidance from a bright line rule: do not take any active
steps to promote infringement, and you will not be liable for
inducement. However, it is not the end of the matter. With world-
renowned copyright experts arguing persuasively in favor of the
conflicting and far less technology-protective theory,91 and courts yet
to make any authoritative finding on the standard for inducement,
parties on both sides of the litigation equation are caught up in a
vortex of uncertainty. Despite the technology-protective rhetoric
permeating the main opinion in Grokster, this is likely to result in a
chill on research and investment in potentially useful distribution
technologies.
The absence of any authoritative finding creates a vortex of
uncertainty for technology providers and investors, as well as content
owners seeking to protect their rights. In these circumstances the
existence of the broader distribution plus intent theory, which is
premised on a standard that can be satisfied with little difficulty,
could have a chilling effect on research and investment into
potentially useful technologies-even without being upheld by any
court.
Inducement's focus is on a defendant's bad intent.92 In situations
where there is no evidence of bad intent-however that concept is
eventually construed-inducement liability provides no remedy. In
such cases content owner plaintiffs are obliged to seek redress via the
doctrines of contributory or vicarious infringement. These doctrines,
and their potential application to BitTorrent Inc., are discussed in
parts IV and V below.
IV. CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
A. Introducing Contributory Liability
The doctrine of contributory liability can be pithily described as
arising where the defendant has knowledge of infringement, and
90. Pamela Samuelson, Three Reactions to MGM v. Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 177, 195 (2006).
91. See generally Ginsburg & Ricketson, supra note 64.
92. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster. Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2005).
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"induces, causes or materially contributes" to it regardless. 93 The
knowledge element of the doctrine will be satisfied where a defendant
knew or had reason to know of the third-party infringement.94 That
knowledge must antedate the infringing activity.95 However, these
rules are subject to the safe harbor created by the Supreme Court in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,96 which
famously involved the liability of Sony for distributing the Betamax
video tape recorder. 97 Individuals largely used the device to tape
television broadcasts to watch later (a process known as "time-
shifting") or to build a library of content. Objecting to these practices,
but considering it impolitic or impractical to sue the third-party
infringers directly, the Universal City and Warner Brothers movie
studios sued Sony.98 The studios alleged that Sony was contributorily
liable for the direct infringements of Betamax owners because it had
constructive knowledge that purchasers were using the Betamax to
directly infringe and that its sale of the device materially contributed
to that infringement. 99 In a decision that has subsequently been seen
as highly technology-protective, the Court created a rule that granted
protection to products that could be put to both infringing and non-
infringing usage. 100 In situations where a product is "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses," the protection precluded knowledge
from being imputed from a product's design or distribution.' 01 In
situations where a defendant has actual knowledge of infringement
93. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971), cited with approval in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 487 (1984); Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930.
94. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
95. Craig A. Grossman, The Evolutionary Drift of Vicarious Liability and Contributory
Infringement: From Interstitial Gap Filler to Arbiter of the Content Wars, 58 SMU L. REV. 357,
382 (2005); Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938). It should be noted that this case
was apparently decided on the basis of vicarious liability, but it has been cited as authority as to
the knowledge element of contributory liability by a number of courts; see, e.g., Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995);
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
96. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
97. Id. at 422.
98. Id. at 420.
99. Id. at 439-42.
100. Id. at456.
101. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931-34 (2005); Sony Corp.,
464 U.S. at 442-43.
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however, and with regard to secondary liability doctrines other than
contributory infringement, the protection has no application.1
0 2
The above description describes the points on which the law is
largely settled. In a number of other respects, however, its meaning is
hotly disputed. Two predominant controversies relate to the Sony
doctrine's meaning: what is the consequence of noninfringing uses
being dwarfed by a much larger number of infringing ones, and how
is the substantiality of noninfringing use assessed? Also, several
inconsistencies exist between the Seventh and Ninth Circuit positions.
These inconsistencies concern the issue of whether products and
services ought to be equated or distinguished in determining Sony's
application, and the role of willful blindness in determining whether
the knowledge element is made out. The Supreme Court was given
the opportunity to clarify these uncertainties when it decided Grokster
in 2005. As the below discussion demonstrates however, its holdings
largely served only to obscure matters even further.
1. It's All Relative? Proportionality and Noninfringing
Use
The first controversy concerns whether the relative prevalence of
infringing use is a relevant consideration in determining whether a
defendant technology falls within the scope of the Sony protection.
The disagreement on this point is epitomized by the positions adopted
by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.
The Ninth Circuit's position is that Sony simply requires
consideration of whether a defendant's product is capable of
substantial noninfringing uses.10 3 In so determining, it focuses entirely
on a technology's noninfringing rather than infringing uses. For
example, in holding that the Grokster technologies were capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, the court noted that, while they
constituted only 10% of the total, "[t]he volume of use would indicate
a minimum of hundreds of thousands of legitimate file exchanges."
0 4
Ginsburg and Ricketson have criticized this reasoning, pointing out
that, when it comes down to it, the ninety percent proportion of
102. See Posting of William Patry to The Patry Copyright Blog,
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/09/grokster-remand-opinion.html, (Sept. 28, 2006, 10:53
AST); R. Anthony Reese, The Temporal Dynamics of "Capable of Substantial Noninfringing
Uses," 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 197, 198 (2006); cf Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (seeming to suggest that inducement is merely a sub-
species of contributory liability).
103. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004).
104. Id.at1162n.10.
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infringing use is even "more extensive."' 0 5 Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit approach seems settled, with defendant technologies treated
the same whether their actual noninfringing use constitutes 1% or
100% of the total, and no regard paid to the relative prevalence of
infringement.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit's position is that a product's
current or future capability for substantial noninfringing uses is only
the first step towards being entitled to protection under Sony.' 06 Once
it has been established that a product has both infringing and
noninfringing uses, it is then necessary to make "some estimate of the
respective magnitudes of these uses.' 1 7 Under this cost-benefit
analysis, a defendant will only receive protection under Sony if it can
prove "that it would have been disproportionately costly [for them] to
eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses. ' '
These contrasting positions disagree as to the significance of a
defendant product having numerically large noninfringing uses that
are nonetheless dwarfed by an overwhelming number of infringing
ones, as well as to whether or not a defendant is obliged to take action
to minimize its product's use for infringement. The Seventh Circuit
seemingly imposes a positive obligation to reduce or eliminate
infringing uses, as long as it would not be "disproportionately costly"
to do so. No such obligation exists in the Ninth Circuit.
The Supreme Court, in Grokster, had an opportunity to resolve
this uncertainty. However, it proved unwilling or unable to
authoritatively determine which approach, if either, should prevail.
Whilst the main opinion did not address the issue, the two three-judge
concurrences mirrored the conflict of the circuit courts. The broadest
position, advocated by Breyer, interprets Sony as protecting
defendants from contributory liability "unless the product in question
will be used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights."' 0 9 This is
similar to the Ninth Circuit position, although potentially less
generous in its treatment of technologies that are almost entirely used
for infringement. In contrast, the Ginsburg concurrence seemingly
agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the relative prevalence of
infringing and noninfringing uses is a relevant consideration in
105. Ginsburg & Ricketson, supra note 64, at 4.
106. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 653.
109. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 957 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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determining whether or not Sony applies.'"0 It held that that the Ninth
Circuit should not have protected the defendants under Sony, since the
defendant technologies were "overwhelmingly" used to infringe and
that there was no "reasonable prospect that substantial or
commercially significant noninfringing uses were likely to develop
over time.""' The concurrence also criticized the lower courts for
failing to distinguish between "uses of Grokster's and StreamCast's
software products (which this case is about) and uses of peer-to-peer
technology generally (which this case is not about)."' 1 2 This approach
places significantly less focus on the potential for a technology to
develop noninfringing uses. While evidence that P2P technologies
generally have certain noninfringing uses is not evidence that the
defendant technologies actually have those uses, it seems clearly
relevant to their capability for being put to that type of noninfringing
use. Exclusion of such potential uses from a determination of whether
Sony applies is akin to removing the "capability" requirement
altogether. 113
Today, it is unclear which of these positions, if any, reflects the
current law. In the P2P context, where numerically significant
noninfringing uses tend to be outweighed by even larger quantities of
infringement, resolution of this controversy is of premier importance.
2. Assessing Substantiality of Noninfringing Use
The second dispute also relates to Sony, and concerns the way in
which substantiality of noninfringing use is assessed. Sony declined to
bestow this standard with any "precise content" beyond suggesting
that noninfringing uses ought to be "commercially significant."
'
"
14
This meant that the only authoritative guidance as to its intended
meaning comes from the Court's own application of the standard.
Unfortunately, the phrasing of the Court's analysis leaves the standard
open to two very different interpretations, each receiving support
from a single three-judge concurrence in Grokster.
The first interpretation, favored by the Ginsburg concurrence, is
that the Betamax only satisfied the standard because time-shifting was
110. See id. at 947-48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Ill. Id. at948.
112. Id.
113. See Posting of Lior Strahilevitz to Picker MobBlog,
http://picker.typepad.com/picker-mobblog/2005/06/is grokster-era.html (June 27, 2005).
114. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
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held to be a noninfringing use. 115 This was the overwhelming use to
which the device was put, and the question of whether or not it
constituted infringement was one of the most significant controversies
to arise in the case. 16 Proponents of this interpretation argue that, had
the matter gone the other way, and time-shifting had indeed been held
to be infringing, the technology would not have been eligible for
protection under the staple article of commerce doctrine." 
7
The second interpretation, adopted by the Breyer concurrence, is
that Sony would have been protected from liability even if time-
shifting had constituted infringement. 18 This interpretation gets its
authority from the way in which the Court addressed the subject of
broadcasts which copyright owners had actually authorized for home-
taping. There was evidence that "7.3% of all Betamax use [was] to
record sports events, and representatives of professional baseball,
football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no objection to
the recording of their televised events for home use."" 9 The Court
then stated that television producers "had authorized duplication of
their copyrighted programs 'in significant enough numbers to create a
substantial market for a noninfringing use of the' VCR."'"2 This has
subsequently been taken to suggest that even a relatively low level of
authorized use is capable of satisfying the Sony standard. 121
Since Sony eventually held that much of the unauthorized use
was in fact noninfringing as a consequence of its decision that time-
shifting constituted fair use, 122 the question whether Sony would have
been protected had it not was never definitively resolved. Since one
interpretation suggests that a defendant technology is protected even
if only a very small proportion of overall use is noninfringing, and the
other does not, this confusion is critical to the future interpretation of
Sony, particularly in the P2P context. With three judges of the
Supreme Court favoring each conflicting interpretation, and the
remaining three refusing to consider the matter, technology providers
115. See id. at 454-55; MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 943-44 (2005)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
116. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 943-44 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 950-51 (Breyer, J., concurring).
119. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 424.
120. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 951 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at
447 n.28).
121. See id. at 950 (Breyer, J., concurring).
122. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 454-55.
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and investors have no way of predicting which way future courts will
resolve the stalemate.1
23
3. The Product/service Distinction
Another inconsistency arising from Sony concerns the
significance of a technology's categorization as product or service.
In the Ninth Circuit, Sony has been interpreted as granting a
different level of protection to the providers of products than to the
providers of services. 24 In A&MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,12 5 the
first case to address the liability of a P2P provider for its users'
infringements, the court held that Sony operates to prevent a court
from imputing that a product provider has the degree of knowledge
necessary to make out contributory liability simply because its
technology could be used for infringement. 126 However, it interpreted
service providers as receiving lesser protection, holding that, "if a
computer system operator learns of specific infringing material
available on his system and fails to purge such material from the
system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct
infringement. ' ' 127 In that situation, Sony has no application because
actual knowledge exists. Service providers do not, however, need to
monitor for infringing activity. "[A]bsent any specific information
which identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator
cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material." 28
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit opted not to distinguish between
products and services, holding that Sony applied equally to both.12 9
This creates a situation where service providers in the Seventh Circuit
receive "more extensive protection under Sony's rule than the Ninth
Circuit's reading would."'
' 30
123. For an expanded discussion on these points see Giblin, supra note 58, at 218-23.
124. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001);
Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 278 (2006).
125. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
126. Id. at 1020-21.
127. Id. at 1021.
128. Id.
129. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2003).
130. Zittrain, supra note 124, at 283.
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4. The Role of Willful Blindness
Finally, it should be noted that the Ninth Circuit has rejected the
argument that "[t]urning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringement
for the sake of profit gives rise to liability," holding that "there is no
separate 'blind eye' theory or element of vicarious liability that exists
independently of the traditional elements of liability."'' This
contrasts with the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, which held
the incorporation of encryption into Aimster's design to constitute a
form of willful blindness.' 
32
B. Contributory Liability & BitTorrent
In light of the significant controversies surrounding the correct
application of contributory liability and Sony, BitTorrent Inc.'s
contributory liability may be decided in any number of equally valid
ways. Most of the distinctions pit the Ninth Circuit against the
Seventh, and the Breyer concurrence against that of Justice
Ginsburg. 33 This analysis walks through BitTorrent Inc.'s potential
liability, highlighting the ways in which its treatment is likely to differ
in accordance with each of these competing positions.
1. In the Ninth Circuit
In assessing BitTorrent Inc.'s potential contributory liability in
the Ninth Circuit, it is necessary to delineate BitTorrent Inc.'s
products from the service it provides. Just as the Ninth Circuit
separately considered Napster Inc.'s liability for providing the
Napster software and the Napster service, this section separately
considers BitTorrent Inc.'s potential liability for providing the
BitTorrent software and protocol, and for providing its search engine.
a. BitTorrent Software & Protocol
Use of the BitTorrent protocol and software involves no post-
distribution involvement of BitTorrent Inc.' 34 Their status as products,
not services, means that they are entitled to the full protection of
131. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1166 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration
in original).
132. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650-51; Andrew J. Lee, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. &
In re Aimster Litigation: A Study of Secondary Copyright Liability in the Peer-to-Peer Context,
20 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 485, 496 (2005).
133. See infra Part VI.B.1-2.
134. See Felton, supra note 16.
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Sony.135 Before the Sony doctrine can apply however, it must be
demonstrated that they are "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses."
13 6
To date, the Ninth Circuit's approach has been to focus entirely
on the noninfringing uses, without reference to the relative
proportionality of infringement.' 37 The Breyer concurrence would
suggest that this position needs slight alteration in situations where a
product "will be used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights."'
' 38
That categorization is inapplicable to BitTorrent technology, given
the technology's use for lawful distribution. Accordingly, under both
the Ninth Circuit and Breyer approaches, BitTorrent Inc. would be
given full protection under Sony. This would prevent constructive
knowledge from being imputed "merely" because the technology can
be used to infringe copyright.
1 39
Accordingly, the only way to make out the knowledge element is
by demonstrating that the defendant "[had] actual knowledge of
infringement at a time when [it could] use that knowledge to stop the
particular infringement."' 140 In Grokster, the Ninth Circuit had held
that the defendant software providers had no such knowledge because
the way the software was coded gave the defendants insufficient
control over their users.' 41 The court was particularly influenced by
the idea that even if the Grokster defendants had "closed their doors
and deactivated all computers within their control, users of their
products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption."
142
The Supreme Court did not expressly overturn this aspect of the
decision on appeal. 143 That reasoning is also apposite to the current
situation. Once individuals download the BitTorrent software, they
135. See supra Part IV.A.3.
136. See supra Part IVA.1.
137. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001)
(making no reference to proportionality in the opinion).
138. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 957 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
139. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21; MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913.
140. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2003),
affd, 380 F.3d 1154, vacated, 545 U.S. 913.
141. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162-63.
142. Id. at 1163 (quoting Grokster, 259 F. Supp. at 1041).
143. Although the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly held Sony to
apply beyond situations where liability rested upon "imputed intent," it did not entirely reject its
contributory liability analysis. Indeed, the Court's reasoning seemed to suggest that the Ninth
Circuit analysis was valid as far as it went, but incomplete since it omitted to consider the issue
of inducement. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932.
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can use it to create a potentially limitless number of peer networks
without any further intervention from its original provider. 144 Indeed,
since the BitTorrent software facilitates the creation of independent,
ephemeral networks, and because the desired content is located
independently of the software itself, BitTorrent Inc. is even more
isolated from its users than were its predecessors.145 Its provision of
the protocol is another step still removed from the provision of the
client software that implements it.14 6 Its inability to do anything to
prevent the resulting infringements means that this element cannot be
satisfied.
Even if the knowledge element could be satisfied, the
contribution element would provide another sticking point. Generally,
there are two main ways to make out material contribution. 47 The
first is where a defendant has directly participated in a third-party
infringement, for example by providing labor. 48 There is no evidence
that BitTorrent Inc. has engaged in any such conduct. The second way
is where the defendant has contributed by supplying the site, facilities,
or materials that facilitate that infringement. 49 In inquiring whether
BitTorrent Inc. provided the site and facilities for infringement, the
analysis of the Ninth Circuit in Grokster is again instructive. 150
BitTorrent Inc., like the Grokster defendants, is not an "access
provider," nor does it "provide file storage and index maintenance."' 5'1
The BitTorrent process does not involve any infringing material being
placed on BitTorrent Inc.'s computers, and BitTorrent Inc. has no
ability to suspend users. 52 As with Grokster and Morpheus, it is the
BitTorrent users who "by connecting to each other over the Internet,
create the network and provide the access."' 53 Indeed, the fact that
BitTorrent software does not even have internal search functionality
makes BitTorrent Inc. even further removed from subsequent
infringement than its predecessors. Under the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning, BitTorrent Inc., like Grokster and Morpheus, does not
provide the "site and facilities" necessary to third party
144. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
145. Id
146. Id.
147. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.1 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2008).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2004).
151. Id.
152. See supra Part 11; see also Grokster 380 F.3d at 1163.
153. Id. at 1163.
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infringement.1 54 Accordingly, it is unlikely BitTorrent Inc. satisfies
the contribution element.
b. BitTorrent Search Engine
The above analysis suggests that, in the Ninth Circuit at least,
BitTorrent Inc. is likely to avoid contributory liability for its provision
of the BitTorrent software and protocol. Might it nonetheless be liable
for providing the search engine?
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act's (DMCA) safe harbor
provisions would likely stop any such action in its tracks.1 55 Under §
512(d), a qualifying service provider will not be liable for linking
users to infringing material via an information location tool as long as
it has no actual knowledge that the material is infringing or awareness
of circumstances that make infringing activity "apparent," does not
satisfy the elements of vicarious liability, and acts "expeditiously" to
remove the reference or link upon notification that it is infringing.
156
BitTorrent Inc. claims to comply fully with these requirements: "[W]e
follow that to the letter. Since the launch of our search engine, we
have responded to every single take-down request sent to us.
Further evidence of BitTorrent Inc.'s compliance with the DMCA can
be inferred from the fact that it received U.S. $8.75 million in venture
capital funding just a few months after its search engine launched, and
an additional U.S. $20 million the following year.158 If BitTorrent Inc.
had not been provably aware of and compliant with the safe harbor
provision from the onset, it seems highly unlikely that such funding
would have been forthcoming. 159 Indeed, BitTorrent Inc.'s C.O.O.
claims that the company not only complies with the DMCA's
154. Id.
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
156. § 512(d).
157. Thomas Mennecke, BitTorrent's Search Filter MIA?, SLYCK, Apr. 4, 2006,
http://www.slyck.com/storyl146.html. This policy is spelt out in the carefully crafted Terms of
Service published on the website. See BitTorrent.com, Site Terms of Use,
http://www.bittorrent.com/termsofuse (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
158. Jefferson Graham, BitTorrent Gets $8.75Mfrom Venture-Capital Firm, USA TODAY,
Sep. 26, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/products/services/2005-09-26-bittorrent-
capital x.htm; Greg Sandoval, BitTorrent Receives $20 Million in Financing, CNET NEWS,
Nov. 30, 2006, http://news.com.corn2061-10802_3-6139882.html.
159. If otherwise, the experiences of fellow venture capitalist Hummer Winblad would
have almost certainly dissuaded potential investors from going anywhere near BitTorrent Inc.
For information about Hummer Winblad's long-running involvement in the Napster litigation,
which extended to 2006, see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408 (N.D.
Cal. 2004); Posting of Ernest Miller to The Importance of..,
http://importance.corante.com/archives/005027.html (Jul. 16, 2004).
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requirements, but it also proactively filters for possible infringements,
thus doing more to prevent infringement than the legislation strictly
requires. 60 In these circumstances, it appears likely that BitTorrent
Inc. would be able to rely on this safe harbor to protect it from
contributory liability for providing its search engine.
If the DMCA did not apply, and liability was determined under
the common law, then the Ninth Circuit's analysis would be
remarkably similar to the statutory regime. That is, once notified of
infringing material, the defendant would become obliged to "purge"
that material from its system.' 61 Zittrain argues that this obligation
extends to removing the material only "as much as is feasible-with
'feasible' no doubt being a much contested debate between the
publisher and the service provider."' 62 Failure to so remove would
result in liability. The evidence already canvassed above, particularly
with regard to BitTorrent Inc.'s effective takedown procedures and
preemptive filtering, suggests that BitTorrent Inc. would be able to
satisfy this standard without difficulty.
2. Contributory Liability in the Seventh Circuit
The above analysis suggests that an application of the Ninth
Circuit and Breyer approaches would result in BitTorrent Inc.
avoiding contributory liability for its users' infringements. This
section now considers whether that outcome would change if
litigation were initiated in the Seventh Circuit. Since that jurisdiction
does not distinguish between products and services, this analysis
considers BitTorrent Inc.'s combined offerings in determining its
liability. It should be noted, the DMCA analysis outlined in the Ninth
Circuit context above also holds true in the Seventh Circuit.'
63
However, it is unclear whether this renders the provision of the search
engine entirely irrelevant to BitTorrent Inc.'s liability, or whether it
may still be considered as part of the matrix of other conduct to form
the basis of liability. For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed
that the latter, more plaintiff-friendly position would prevail.
The focus of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation 64 was on the way in which the Sony rule
160. See P-to-P, supra note 39.
161. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal.
1995))
162. Zittrain, supra note 124, at 280-81.
163. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
164. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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applied. It paid only scant attention to contributory infringement's
other requirements. Post-Aimster case law has made it clear that
contributory liability in that jurisdiction still requires the traditional
elements of knowledge and material contribution to be satisfied. 65 As
a result of that decision however, Seventh Circuit courts also take a
number of additional factors into account, particularly the "respective
magnitudes" of infringing and noninfringing uses, whether the
defendant attempted to "eliminate or reduce" infringing uses, whether
it "encouraged" infringement and whether it was "willfully blind" to
third-party infringement. 166 With these considerations in mind, the
following paragraphs consider BitTorrent Inc.'s potential contributory
liability in the Seventh Circuit.
a. Actual Knowledge
In order to determine whether BitTorrent Inc. may be
contributorily liable for supplying the BitTorrent software to third
parties, the necessary first step is to assess whether it had knowledge
of the infringement. As explained above, in the Seventh Circuit this
may be satisfied "where a party has been notified of specific
infringing uses of its technology and fails to act to prevent future such
infringing uses, or willfully blinds itself to such infringing uses.'
67
BitTorrent Inc. seems not to have the requisite actual knowledge
of third party infringement. Its knowledge is analogous to that Sony
had of Betamax users, since it has no knowledge or control over
usage once its product reaches the hands of users. The existence of its
search engine does not substantially alter that position, since
BitTorrent Inc. has apparently already exercised the full extent of its
power to prevent search engine-related infringements by reducing or
eliminating links to infringing content. 168 Thus, although BitTorrent
Inc. must be generally aware that the application is used for
infringement-at least by virtue of news reports and DMCA takedown
notices-it does not have knowledge over "specific" infringing uses,
and has no knowledge at any time when it can do something to
prevent them. The existence of such an ability to prevent the eventual
infringement is the crux of the reason for imposing liability upon
165. See, e.g., Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 883 (N.D.
Ill. 2005); Bosch v. Ball-Kell, 80 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1713, 1724 (C.D. Ill. 2006) (quoting Monotype,
376 F. Supp. 2d at 883).
166. Monotype, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 886-87.
167. Id. at 886 (citing Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650).
168. See P-bo-P, supra note 39.
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contributory infringers. 169 Certainly, if the purpose of the knowledge
requirement is to require the defendant to take steps to prevent or
ameliorate the infringing activity, it follows that the knowledge must
exist at a time that makes it possible to achieve this aim. In these
circumstances, it appears that BitTorrent Inc. does not have the
requisite knowledge.
b. Willful Blindness
The second limb provides that knowledge may nonetheless be
made out where a defendant "willfully blinds itself' to
infringement. 170 The Seventh Circuit prevented Aimster from taking
advantage of its own lack of knowledge by holding that "a service
provider that would otherwise be a contributory infringer does not
obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself from actual
knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is being
used."' 171 This notion of willful blindness applies to those who
"knowing or strongly suspecting that [they are] involved in shady
dealings, take[] steps to make sure that [they do] not acquire full or
exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings. ."' 72 It
is unlikely that BitTorrent Inc. would be held to have blinded itself to
infringement in this manner. In Aimster, the defendant had utilized
encryption "to prevent himself from learning" that Aimster users were
copyright infringers.' 73 The encryption feature had little or no utility
other than this. 174 And it was only through the existence of the
encryption feature that the defendant could have avoided knowledge-
the central server architecture utilized by Aimster otherwise rendered
it clearly liable in accordance with the principles laid down in both
Napster and Aimster.175 In contrast, the BitTorrent software does not
use encryption or any other artificial device aimed at preventing itself
from developing knowledge of infringement. 76 Indeed, the way the
software is coded makes it easy for interested parties to ascertain the
Internet addresses of users that are apparently infringing.' 77 Instead,
169. See Grossman, supra note 95, at 366-67.
170. Monotype, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 886 (citing Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650).
171. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650-5 1.
172. Id. at 650 (citation omitted).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 653.
175. Id. at 654-55.
176. Posting of Ernesto to TorrentFreak, http://torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-encryption-
myths-071108/ (Nov. 7, 2007).
177. Id.
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the lack of knowledge seems to be a natural corollary of any tool that
facilitates the creation of isolated networks on demand. Since that
characteristic of the distribution tool is one of its most useful features,
it would be difficult to attribute it with any nefarious purpose.
c. Constructive Knowledge and Sony
The knowledge element may nonetheless be satisfied if
constructive knowledge can be imputed. This will only be possible if
the defendant technology cannot receive protection under the Sony
doctrine. 
178
A difference of opinion exists as to whether the Seventh Circuit
requires a product to have actual substantial noninfringing uses or a
mere capability for such uses in order to obtain the protection of
Sony. 179 For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that the
narrower standard applies, and actual use need be proven. As
explained above, BitTorrent is widely used for legitimate distribution
of a wide variety of content, including movies and television
shows. 180 In these circumstances, the technology is likely to satisfy
the threshold standard of having substantial noninfringing uses. In the
Ninth Circuit such a finding would end the Sony inquiry. 181 In the
Seventh Circuit however, the defendant must go on to prove "that it
would have been disproportionately costly for [the defendant] to
eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses."
' 182
This formulation seems to require that the defendant justify its
design choices by proving that it would have been too expensive to
design or redesign its software to reduce infringement.18 3 Samuelson
suggests that the test may require:
The comparative losses.. . to be weighed against the costs of
installing infringement-inhibiting technologies such as filters. If
the cost of installing infringement-inhibiting technology is not
"disproportionately costly" as compared with infringement
averted, Aimster says a technology developer that chooses not to
178. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
179. See Alfred C. Yen, Sony, Tort Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 815, 842-43 (2005); but cf Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REv. 859, 887
(2004).
180. See Bowes, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1162.
182. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003).
183. See Samuelson, supra note 90, at 191-92.
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adopt the inhibiting design should be secondarily liable for user
infringements.
18 4
On its face, this requirement is an onerous one, placing a burden
on defendants that increases commensurately with the proportion of
third party infringement, even though its scope may be outside the
defendant's control. The way the standard is formulated clearly
suggests that the larger the proportion of infringing uses, the more the
defendant is obliged to do to reduce them. 8 5 This puts BitTorrent Inc.
in an unfavorable position, since, as discussed above,' 86 its
illegitimate uses likely far outweigh the noninfringing uses.
However, the way the Seventh Circuit applied this requirement
in Aimster seems to suggest that it is less onerous than its wording
prima facie suggests. The court held the defendant was unable to
satisfy this requirement since he "fail[ed] to present evidence that the
provision of an encryption capability effective against the service
provider itself added important value to the service or saved
significant cost.' 187 This reasoning suggests that if the only feasible
way to reduce or eliminate infringement is to change the design of
elements that contribute to a product's efficiency or effectiveness,
such measures may be "disproportionately costly." That is, the cost
that is at issue is not necessarily one that is purely financial; it can
also be measured in terms of the cost to the technological efficiency
or effectiveness of the product. This suggests that if BitTorrent Inc.
can demonstrate that the design choices it made, which prevented it
from having knowledge and control over its users (i.e. the swarm
model and outsourced searching), provided value to the overall
product, it may still receive protection under Sony. Given the
efficiencies achieved by the BitTorrent technology, which enables
fast, widespread distribution at little cost to content providers or
consumers, it seems likely that BitTorrent Inc. could satisfy this
standard. This is because, although it may potentially be relatively
inexpensive to alter the BitTorrent software and protocol, any such
changes would likely result in a considerable loss of efficiency.
Similarly, since BitTorrent Inc.'s search engine already appears to
implement every possible practical measure to reduce or eliminate
infringement, and it is difficult to think of anything else they might do
to prevent its use for infringement whilst preserving noninfringing
184. Id. at 192.
185. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 5-12.
187. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
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uses, it seems that it would be "disproportionately costly" to eliminate
or substantially reduce any of its residual infringing uses.
A similar approach was advocated by the Ginsburg concurrence
in Grokster. That approach asks whether, relative to the actual
number of infringements, the BitTorrent software is put to substantial
noninfringing uses.1 88 Unlike the technologies at issue in Grokster,
which Justice Ginsburg considered to have no "reasonable prospect"
of developing substantial noninfringing uses,' 89 the BitTorrent
software already has such uses in place.1 90 Combined with its
widespread content partnerships,' 9 BitTorrent Inc. is likely to satisfy
this standard.
Regardless of whether the Ginsburg or Seventh Circuit approach
is adopted, it seems that BitTorrent Inc. is likely to receive the
protection of Sony. Accordingly, constructive knowledge cannot be
imputed.
d. Contribution Element
Even if the knowledge element were satisfied, the contribution
element still must be satisfied in order for liability to be made out.
The Seventh Circuit in Aimster did not explicitly refer to this element
in its analysis; although its findings that Aimster had "invited"
infringement by providing tutorials that only had infringing examples
suggests that the defendant had indeed induced, caused, or materially
contributed to the infringement. 192 It seems that Seventh Circuit courts
are considering this element when they ask whether a defendant
"encouraged" the third party infringement.
The material contribution analysis outlined in the Ninth Circuit
context above is equally valid here. There is no evidence that
BitTorrent Inc. has made any such relevant contribution to its users'
188. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 942 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
189. Id. at 948.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
191. Press Release, BitTorrent Inc., Warner Bros. Home Entertainment Group Announces
Revolutionary Deal to Publish Legal Film and TV Content Using the BitTorrent Platform (May
9, 2006), http://www.bittorrent.com/pressreleases/2006/05/09/warner-bros-home-entertainment-
group-announces-revolutionary-deal-to-publish-legal-film-and-tv-content-using-the-bittorrent-
platform; Press Release, BitTorrent Inc., BitTorrent Strikes Digital Download Deals with 20th
Century Fox, G4, Kadokawa, Lionsgate, MTV Networks, Palm Pictures, Paramount and Starz
Media (Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.bittorrent.com/pressreleases/2006/1 1/29/bittorrent-strikes-
digital-download-deals-with-20th-century-fox-g4-kadokawa-lionsgate-mtv-networks-palm-
pictures-paramount-and-starz-media.
192. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 655.
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infringement. Far from encouraging the infringement, Cohen has
consistently denounced its use for infringement and actively pursued
expansion of its use for legitimate distribution.' 9 3 In these
circumstances, the contribution element is unlikely to be satisfied.
3. Conclusion
It is unlikely that BitTorrent Inc. would be found contributorily
liable for the infringements of its users in either the Ninth or Seventh
Circuits. However, those two jurisdictions would reach that outcome
very differently. These differences in reasoning mean that a
technology provider that would have escaped liability in the Ninth
Circuit may nonetheless be held liable in the Seventh, and vice versa.
This again makes it difficult for future developers, investors, and
content owners to accurately predict their rights and liabilities under
the existing law.
V. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
A. Introducing Vicarious Liability
The U.S. doctrine of vicarious liability extends to copyright
infringement outside the employer/employee relationship where the
defendant "has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity
and also has a direct financial interest in such activities."' 9 4 The
apparent bright-line nature of this rule masks three significant
uncertainties: the degree of supervisory power sufficient for liability
to attach, the directness of financial benefit needed, and the
consequences of the supervisory power being fully exercised.
1. Ability to Supervise
The first controversy concerns the extent to which a defendant
must have the ability to supervise infringement in order for the
element to be satisfied. Strict and expansive approaches have been
taken to its interpretation.
The stricter approach requires the "right and ability to supervise"
to consist of a genuine "practical" ability to control the direct
infringer's infringement.' 95 Under this approach, if a defendant has a
technical right to control a direct infringer, but it is impractical for
193. See Schiesel, supra note 43; Bowes, supra note 8.
194. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
195. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 147, § 8.2.2.
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them to actually do so, no vicarious liability will attach. 9 6 This
approach is illustrated by Artists Music v. Reed Publishing,'97 a case
involving the liability of a defendant trade show operator which
rented space from a convention center in which to hold a home
show. 198 Its rental agreement with the center provided that it would be
"solely responsible for any copyright or royalty payments due in
connection with any broadcast, performance or publication of music
or other audio or visual presentations at or arising from the center."'
' 99
The defendant then rented that space to 134 different companies
which used it to exhibit their own products and services during the
show. 200 The agreements between the defendant and individual booth
operators did not mention the use of copyrighted music. The
defendant itself declined to purchase a license from The American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") on the
basis that it considered music licensing to be the responsibility of the
exhibitors, but it supplied each exhibitor with a pamphlet advising
them to contact ASCAP for a license if they wished to perform
copyrighted music. 20' The exhibitors committed a number of
infringements.20 2 The Court held that although the defendant trade
show organizer could technically, and at considerable expense, have
policed its exhibitors to catch and remedy infringing conduct, it was
under no obligation to do so because it lacked any practical right and
ability to supervise and control its exhibitors' actions.20 3
The expansive approach is significantly less concerned with the
practicality of the defendant's ability to supervise. It is epitomized by
Polygram International Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 204 a case
factually almost identical to Artist's Music.2°5 The defendant rented
196. Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability for
Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REV.
1005, 1013 (2000); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 147, § 8.2.2. Naturally, if a defendant does have a
real ability to supervise the infringement and simply chooses not to exercise it, that will not
protect them from liability. See Varon v. Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 716, 718
(D.N.M. 1982).
197. Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1624.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1624-25.
203. Id at 1627; see also Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster,
91 MINN. L. REV. 184, 201-02 (2006).
204. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994).
205. Compare Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D.
Mass. 1994), with Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1623 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
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space in a number of buildings which it then sub-rented to over 2000
exhibitors.20 6 The booth space agreement required exhibitors to abide
by the defendant's "Rules and Regulations," which provided that it
was the responsibility of exhibitors to obtain copyright licenses for
any music played during the trade show, and that any music that was
played must not be intrusive to other exhibitors.20 7 They also specified
that, if "because of noise, method of operation, materials or any other
reason [they became] objectionable," exhibits could be restricted.20 8
During the show a number of the defendant's employees "policed"
the exhibitors for compliance with these rules. 20 9 The plaintiffs case
failed because they had failed to prove any underlying primary
infringement by an exhibitor.210 In dicta however, the Court held that
the defendants would have been vicariously liable had such
infringement been made out.2 1 The crux of this finding was the fact
that the organizer had and exercised the ability to control exhibitors
through enforcement of the afore-mentioned rules. 212 "[The organizer]
could have altered its Rules and Regulations to prohibit music ... but
it did not .... Instead, [it] chose only to prohibit music at levels that
were intrusive to other exhibitors, and advised exhibitors to obtain
proper licenses for any music they did play. 21 3 Combined with the
fact that a number of the organizer's employees actually did "police"
the exhibitors for compliance during the show, the Court was
convinced that the defendant had the right and ability to control its
214
exhibitors' infringements. Professor Alfred Yen argues that this
approach expands the supervision element by "endors[ing] the
principle that the simple ability to veto the use of music by the
primary infringer would be enough to establish the necessary
control. 215
(in both cases copyright holders sued trade show organizers for infringement based on the
performance of copyrighted music).
206. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1319.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1329.
209. Id. at 1328.
210. Id. at 1323-24; see also Grossman, supra note 95, at 372-73.
211. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1324-34.
212. Id. at 1328-29.
213. Id. at 1328.
214. Id. at 1328-29.
215. See Yen, supra note 179, at 823 (citing Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1326).
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2. Directness of Financial Interest
Competing approaches also dictate opposing conclusions with
regard to how direct the financial interest must be for a court to find
liability.
The stricter approach requires the defendant's financial interest
in the third-party infringement to be direct, and requires a close causal
connection between the third-party infringement and the defendant's
revenue. In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 2 16 the case
that first formulated the modem vicarious liability doctrine, defendant
21received a percentage of its concessionaire's sales receipts 17 Since
the concessionaire's distribution of bootlegged records resulted in
higher sales and revenue, the defendant had a sufficiently direct
financial interest in the infringement to satisfy this element.2 1 8 In
contrast, in Artists Music the rental amount payable by each exhibitor
was a flat rate calculated on the amount of occupied space, and the
defendant also received revenue from admission fees it charged the
show's visitors. 219 In that case it was held that the financial benefit
element was not satisfied, on the basis that the defendant's
"revenues ... did not in any way depend on whether or not the
exhibitors played any music whatsoever.,
220
This contrasts strongly with the broader approach, which once
again can be illustrated by Polygram. The Polygram defendants, like
those in Artist's Music, were paid a flat rate per square foot of booth
space, as well as advertising revenues and admission fees. 22' Since
they were paid a flat rental fee "unconnected to the content of the
infringing performance" 222 and because there was only evidence of
infringement against four of the 2000 exhibitors (occupying just
0.002% of the total available space),223 the Polygram defendants
argued that they lacked a sufficiently direct financial interest.22 a The
plaintiffs argued that the requisite financial interest did in fact exist
216. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
217. Id. at 306.
218. Id. at 308.
219. Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1623, 1624 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
220. Id. at 1627.
221. Polygram Int'l Publ'g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1319(D. Mass.
1994).
222. Id. at 1331.
223. Id. at 1333.
224. Id. •
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because "that music enhanced the effectiveness of the show. 225
Although that argument had previously been rejected in Artists
Music, 226 the court concluded that the requisite direct financial interest
did in fact exist because the defendant organizer expected commercial
benefit from the show and because music was an important part of
facilitating communication between exhibitors and attendees. 227 The
court also dismissed the argument that the proportion of infringing
exhibitors was too minute to satisfy the element, holding that "[t]he
crucial question for establishing the benefit prong of the test for
vicarious liability is not the exact amount of the benefit, but only
whether the defendant derived a benefit from the infringement that
was substantial enough to be considered significant.,
228
The broader interpretation was expanded still further in 2000 by
a district court in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.22 9 It held that,
although Napster Inc. had never actually made any money from its
users' infringements, the fact that "[i]t hope[d] to 'monetize' its user
base through one of several [possible] generation revenue models"
was sufficient to satisfy the element.23) The Ninth Circuit upheld this
holding on appeal.2 31 Today it is unclear which of these positions-
narrow, broader, broadest, or some variant of the three-will prevail in
future cases.
3. Consequence of Exercising Right of Supervision
The third controversy concerns the consequences of fully
exercising a right of supervision. The origins of vicarious liability lie
in the tort theory of enterprise liability, 232 which rationalizes that
businesses that cause losses ought to be responsible for their
rectification.233 Such internalization encourages risk creators to guard
against losses, and, if they occur anyway, to provide compensation to
victims and spread the cost of doing so among those who have
225. Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1851 (2000).
226. Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1623, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
227. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1331-32.
228. Id. at 1333.
229. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd, 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
230. Id. at 921; see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital
Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1345, 1368 (2004).
231. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001).
232. See Yen, supra note 225, at 1843.
233. Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict
Liability, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1285, 1286 (2001).
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benefited from the risk-creating activity.234 In accordance with these
objectives, whether or not a defendant fully exercised its right to
supervise has long been held irrelevant to liability.
235
In A&M Records v. Napster, however, the Ninth Circuit
introduced a dramatic change to that longstanding rule: a defendant
could avoid vicarious liability by exercising its right to supervise or
"police" users' infringements "to its fullest extent., 236 Similarly, the
Supreme Court in Grokster defined vicarious infringement as
"profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right
to stop or limit it."'237 As Yen explains, this formulation clearly
suggests that "[n]o longer does a defendant face liability even if she
exercises control. To the contrary, she escapes liability if she
exercises whatever control she has, even if she fails to stop the
infringement." 238 Neither court expressly acknowledged that their
formulations created new law; indeed, each cited classic cases that
clearly held it to be a strict liability doctrine.239  In these
circumstances, it is uncertain whether vicarious infringement remains
a strict liability doctrine, as maintained by decades of authority, or
whether liability can now be avoided by fully exercising the right to
supervise.
B. Vicarious Liability & BitTorrent
In light of the above controversies, and the fact that DMCA safe
harbors provide no protection for vicarious infringement,24° what is
BitTorrent Inc.'s potential vicarious liability for providing its
software, protocol, and search engine?
1. Financial Benefit
The first element of the tort premises culpability for vicarious
infringement on the existence of some profit or other financial
benefit. As explained above, there are two very different schools of
234. See Yen, supra note 225, at 1843.
235. See Yen, supra note 203, at 228-29; Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316
F.2d 304, 307 (2nd. Cir. 1963).
236. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023.
237. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). (citing Shapiro, 316
F.2d at 307) (emphasis added).
238. See Yen, supra note 203, at 229.
239. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 (citing Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307); Napster, 239
F.3d at 1023 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996)).
240. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)-(d) (2000). Regarding the inapplicability of these safe harbors in
the vicarious liability context, see Wright, supra note 196, at 1007. But see Yen, supra note 225,
at 1883.
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thought as to the threshold that must be met in order for this element
to be satisfied.24  Before comparing the two approaches, it is
necessary to precisely identify the nature and value of BitTorrent
Inc.'s financial benefit in its users' infringements.
BitTorrent Inc. released both the BitTorrent protocol and
BitTorrent client software for free, and unlike many of its P2P
predecessors, the BitTorrent software never featured built-in
advertising.242 Instead, BitTorrent Inc.'s business model hinges on
authorized uses, particularly the legitimate content licensing and
distribution deals that were mentioned above.243 However, its website
and search engine are supported by paid advertising,244 and that
means that its revenues increase as more people visit its site. Given
the extent of BitTorrent's use for unlawful copying, it follows that
many individuals must visit that site to download the software in
order to use it for infringement. BitTorrent Inc. has also secured
millions of dollars in venture capital, as well as an unknown
additional amount attributable to its licensing deals with content
providers.245 Do these factors constitute a sufficiently direct financial
interest to satisfy the first element of vicarious infringement?
As described in the preceding paragraphs, the narrow approach
requires the defendant's financial interest in the third-party
infringement to be "obvious and direct," with a close causal
connection between revenue and third-party infringement.246 The
reasoning of Shapiro and Artists Music clearly suggests that the
247revenue must directly increase in line with infringement.  There
appears to be no such direct link in this instance. At best, BitTorrent
Inc.'s revenues increase only indirectly as a result of third party
infringement. Under this approach, the requisite financial element
appears to be missing.
241. See supra Part V.A. 1-2.
242. Wendy Davis, Grokster-Bundled Adware Hawks Movie, MEDIAPOST, Mar. 25, 2005,
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.san&s=28535&Nid= 12
722&p=244505.
243. See, e.g., Bowes, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 8 and 32 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
246. Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2nd. Cir. 1963); see
also William Sloan Coats, Mark R. Weinstein & Erik R. Zimmerman, Pre- and Post-Grokster
Copyright Infringement Liability for Secondary and Tertiary Parties, 842 PLI/Pat 221, 230
(2005).
247. See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308; see also Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publ'g, Inc., 31
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1623, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
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The result may be different, however, if the broader approach is
applied. The defendant in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.
248
was held to satisfy this element because it received "substantial
financial benefits from admission fees, concession stand sales and
parking fees, all of which [flowed] directly from customers who
[wanted] to buy the counterfeit recordings at bargain basement
prices," and because the sale of the infringing music was a "draw" for
swap meet patrons. 249 Similarly, BitTorrent Inc. has benefited
financially from the advertising on its website, with at least part of
that revenue certain to have flowed from users who wanted to use its
software for infringement.25 ° Undoubtedly, the software's known use
and suitability for such infringing uses attracts such users to the
site. 25 1 Additionally, it is highly unlikely that BitTorrent Inc. would
have been able to secure its lucrative content licensing and venture
capital deals had the technology's massive adoption for infringement
not made BitTorrent Inc. and its then-Chief Executive Officer Brain
Cohen so influential in the P2P world.2 52 This may also be indicative
of the requisite financial benefit. Accordingly, it is certainly arguable
that the financial benefit element could be made out under this broad
approach.
2. Supervision Element
Even if the financial benefit element is satisfied, the defendant
must also have the "right and ability to supervise" the infringement in
order for the court to find liability.
253
In determining whether this standard is met, it is necessary to
consider the precise nature of its ability to supervise its users'
infringements. As the technical description of the technology makes
clear, any such ability is extremely limited.254 The BitTorrent client
software is a tool that facilitates the distribution of any type of file
and any type of content.255 Because it has no internal search
functionality, the software itself has no involvement in the choice of
248. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996)
249. Id. at 263-64.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 8 and 32.
251. Paul R. La Monica, Is BitTorrent the Next Big IPO?, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 28,
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/28/commentary/mediabiz/?postversion=2007032812.
252. Greg Sandoval, BitTorrent Inks License Deal with Studios, ZDNET, July 10, 2006,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588_22-148734.html.
253. See Coats, supra note 246, at 230.
254. See discussion supra Part II.A.
255. Id.
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that file.256 Accordingly, BitTorrent Inc. has little right to supervise
arising from the provision of the software itself. It does have
considerable ability to supervise infringement that occurs via its own
search engine, but, in light of its compliance with the DMCA and its
effective preemptive filtering regime, users who use BitTorrent to
infringe are likely to do so by obtaining the relevant torrents from
independent hosting sites. BitTorrent Inc. has no power whatsoever
over such sites.
In these circumstances, it is unlikely that the supervision element
can be made out, even under the broader approach. Not only does the
software give BitTorrent Inc. no "genuine" or "practical" ability to
control the third party infringement, it does not even seem to have a
technical ability to do SO. 2 5 7 The search engine gives them more
control than the software, but existing case law dictates that even that
is insufficient to satisfy this element.258  Perfect 10, Inc. v.
259. fteeAmazon.com, Inc., is one of the few cases to date to consider the
liability of a search engine provider for the provision of links to
infringing content. 261 In it, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
Google was vicariously liable for enabling third-parties to use its
search engine to find and copy infringing photographs. 261 The Court
held that no vicarious liability could attach because Google lacked the
"right and ability to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct of
third-party websites. 262 This was because it could not prevent "any of
the third-party websites from reproducing, displaying, and
distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect 10's images because that
infringing conduct [took] place on the third-party websites. Google
[could not] terminate those third-party websites or block their ability
to 'host and serve infringing full-size images' on the Internet., 263 As
outlined above,264 BitTorrent Inc.'s online search engine, like that of
Google, works by "crawling" the World Wide Web for torrent files.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007)
(stating that a search engine provider could be contributorily liable for third party users'
infringing activities if it had knowledge of such infringement, could have taken "simple
measures" to prevent further infringement, and failed to do so).
259. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
260. Id. at710-11.
261. Id. at 729-31.
262. Id. at 731.
263. Id. (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (C.D. Cal.
2006)).
264. See supra Part II.A.
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Like Google, BitTorrent's engine merely provides links to files hosted
elsewhere. There is no control that can be exercised to prevent those
sites from continuing to exist on the Internet. On that reasoning,
BitTorrent's search engine does not give it the requisite right and
ability to supervise third-party infringement.
If it was held that BitTorrent Inc. did in fact have some right to
supervise its users' infringements, controversy would arise regarding
whether that would itself be sufficient for the supervision element to
be satisfied. BitTorrent Inc. would inevitably argue that it had
exercised that right to its fullest extent, by complying with the DMCA
notice-and-takedown regime and by implementing effective
preemptive filtering of apparently infringing content. Under
traditional formulations of vicarious liability, the fact that it had fully
policed users' infringements to the extent of its ability to do so would
be irrelevant. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach however, that
defense would prevent a finding of liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
This walkthrough of BitTorrent Inc.'s potential liability under
the existing U.S. secondary liability law has illustrated just how
ragged a patchwork that law has become.
On balance, the analysis suggests that BitTorrent Inc. is unlikely
to be held secondarily liable for its users' infringements. But that
conclusion is likely to offer little comfort to either BitTorrent Inc. or
to innovators of similar tools, given the knife-edge that separates it
from the opposite outcome. The law's fractured state means that,
under all three doctrines, ample authority exists to support a number
of competing and contradictory outcomes. This leaves would-be
technology developers and investors with little ability to accurately
predict whether their products will render them liable for their users'
infringements. If such a prediction is difficult for lawyers at a time
when a product has already been distributed and used for a number of
years, consider the difficulty for developers nursing still-fledgling
ideas. The difficulty in assessing the probable liability for the
executed product could, will, and undoubtedly already has resulted in
such ideas being abandoned at an early stage.
The existence of these uncertainties has a tremendous hidden
impact on technology regulation. Much of the secondary liability case
law canvassed in this work reads as being powerfully protective of
technological innovation: Sony and Grokster in particular are redolent
with pro-technology rhetoric. However, the significant legal
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uncertainty that surrounds the proper scope and content insidiously
weakens those protections. Professor Lawrence Lessig has previously
highlighted the effect of uncertainty on technology providers.
Although his comments were made in the inducement context, they
are also applicable to the effect of uncertainty on the doctrines of
contributory and vicarious infringement:
By making it a process that goes through the courts, you've just
increased the legal uncertainty around innovation substantially and
created great opportunities to defeat legitimate competition.
You've shifted an enormous amount of power to those who oppose
new types of competitive technologies. Even if in the end, you as
the innovator are right, you still spent your money on lawyers
instead of on marketing or a new technology.
Already, money has shifted into places which will avoid any
conflict with the copyright holders. Why buy a lawsuit when you
can buy a new innovation that doesn't get you a lawsuit? And you
don't even see it; you don't even know what you don't get,
because people are afraid.
265
BitTorrent Inc. may indeed win, as this analysis suggests, if its
liability is ever tested in the courts. But the twisted and broken
threads of the secondary liability patchwork mean that content owners
will be the winners in an uncountable number of cases that will never
reach court. Cases where shallow-pocketed startups failed because
investors were wary of buying a possible lawsuit. Cases where
potentially useful technologies were never developed. As matters now
stand, existing judicial safeguards crafted to protect new
technological innovations are indeed being abrogated by stealth.
265. Rob Hof, Larry Lessig: Grokster Decision Will Chill Innovation, Bus. WEEK
ONLINE, June 28, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/the-thread/techbeat/archives/2005/06/larrylessig-gr.html
(alterations in original) (quoting an interview with Larry Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford
Law School by Robert Hot).
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